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Potential impact of carbon emissions trading on China’s power sector: 
A perspective from different allowance allocation options 
Abstract: 
In Copenhagen climate conference China government promised that China would cut down 
carbon intensity 40-45% from 2005 by 2020. Carbon emissions trading (CET) is an effective tool to 
reduce emissions. But because CET is not fully implemented in China up to now, how to design it and 
its potential impact are unknown to us. This paper studies the potential impact of introduction of CET 
on China’s power sector and discusses the impact of different allocation options of allowances. 
Agent-based modeling is one appealing new methodology that has the potential to overcome some 
shortcomings of traditional methods. We establish an agent-based model (CETICEM) of introduction 
of CET to China. In CETICEM, six types of agents and two markets are modeled. We find that: (1) 
CET internalizes environment cost; increases the average electricity price by 12%; and transfers carbon 
price volatility to the electricity market, increasing electricity price volatility by 4%. (2) CET 
influences the relative cost of different power generation technologies through the carbon price, 
significantly increasing the proportion of environmentally friendly technologies; expensive solar power 
generation in particular develops significantly, with final proportion increasing by 14%. (3) 
Emission-based allocation brings about both higher electricity and carbon prices than by output-based 
allocation which encourages producers to be environmentally friendly. Therefore, output-based 
allocation would be more conducive to reducing emissions in the Chinese power sector. 
Keywords: Agent-based model; Carbon emissions trading; Emission-based allocation; Output-based 
allocation 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The European Union (EU) emission trading scheme (ETS) directive was first published in 2003, 
aiming at helping its members prepare for carbon emission targets agreed in the Kyoto Protocol for the 
2008 to 2012 trading period [1]. An emission-based allocation was available in EU ETS. From January 
1, 2005, if enterprises of member states are about to emit carbon dioxide, they must gain the rights to 
do so, which can be received from their government or bought from the carbon trading market. The 
main reason for the introduction of ETS is that it can reduce emissions in a cost-effective way [2]. 
Since January 1, 2008, emission rights can be traded among EU countries. 
With rapid economic development, China’s energy consumption, especially electricity 
consumption, has grown rapidly. More than 75% of China’s electricity power is thermal power. 
Coal-fired electricity generation has increased rapidly over recent years. From 1991 to 2005, the 
proportion of coal-fired generation in thermal power was maintained at 90%-96%, meaning large 
amounts of carbon emissions during that period. In 2005, carbon emissions from the Chinese power 
sector reached 38.73% of total emissions of primary energy [3]. The Chinese power generation sector 
has been liberalized, allowing competition. The current electricity pricing mechanism in China is 
mainly based on the up-grid electricity price management approach, implemented May 1, 2005. 
Two-part electricity prices are applied to the generation units. The capacity price is set by the 
government. The electricity price is determined through market competition. The specific price is set 
through consultations between the power generation and power grid companies, on the premise that 
generation cost can be compensated. 
In this paper, we study the potential impact of introducing CET on China’s power sector. This is 
because, on the one hand, carbon emissions from the power sector are large; and, on the other hand, 
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because of regional division of the power market, cross-border and inter-regional electricity 
transmission is relatively small, subject to transmission capacity and line loss. According to China 
Energy Statistical Yearbook 2008, China's power imports in 2007 only accounted for 0.13% of the total 
electricity supply [4]. Introduction of CET will inevitably increase the companies’ costs and weaken 
their international competitiveness. As was argued above, inter-connector capacity between China and 
neighboring countries is relatively low and it is not expected to increase dramatically. Therefore the 
physical supply of electricity will remain a regional product. That means that the model here is 
applicable for China power sector. 
This paper attempts to establish an agent-based model on the introduction of CET into the 
Chinese power market, and attempt to answer the following questions: 
(1) What would be the impact of CET on the electricity price and final portfolio of power plants? 
(2) What would be the difference of emission-based allocation and output-based allocation? What 
is the micro mechanism behind it? Which allocation mechanism would be more suitable for China’s 
domestic carbon market? 
The results may shed light on the wisdom of the government’s decision and even potentially cause 
a change in policy. Also, some conclusions may be the general rules of carbon market, which will be a 
contribution to existing literatures. The article is structured as follows: firstly, we will introduce the 
literatures relating to the carbon market mechanism and agent-based model; secondly, a 
CET-introduced Chinese electricity market simulation model is established; thirdly, we carry out 
simulations to answer the questions above; finally, a summary and some policy implications are given. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
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The literatures relating to CET mainly focuses on carbon market mechanism design and its 
applications between and within countries. Regarding carbon market mechanism design, Bohringer and 
Lange discuss emission-based and output-based allocations [5]. They find that in a closed-trade system, 
emission-based allocation is better; however, in an open-loop system, combination of the two 
allocations is better. Cramton and Kerr believe that the government should auction carbon emission 
rights, rather than allocating them for free [6]. They argue that auction can promote technological 
innovation and share cost effectively. Burtraw et al. compared auction, and emission-based and 
output-based allocations based on the Haiku electricity market model [7, 8]. They find that the social 
cost of auction is about half of the two free allocation types, and that emission-based allocation is more 
favorable to producers, while output-based allocation leads to the lowest electricity price and highest 
gas price. 
Regarding inter-state trading of emission rights, Haurie and Viguier propose a computable 
stochastic equilibrium model to represent possible competition between Russia and China on the 
international market of carbon emissions permits [9]. They analyzed the impact of this competition on 
the pricing of emissions permits and on the effectiveness of the Kyoto and post-Kyoto agreements, 
without US participation. Carlén investigate market power in intergovernmental CET based on a 
simulation [10]. They find that (i) the presence of a large trader is not likely to create inefficiencies, and 
(ii) a large trader is not likely to be able to substantially influence prices to its advantage during 
end-period trading. Bosello and Roson explore the distributional consequences of alternative emissions 
trading schemes [11]. They find that the introduction of a competitive market for emissions permits, 
especially when this market includes non-Annex I countries (developing countries), would dramatically 
lower total abatement costs but, on the other hand, would primarily benefit the richest countries. 
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Regarding intra-state trading of emission rights, Keats et al. believe that as a result of introducing 
EU ETS, the net values of both a typical pulverized coal-fired (PC) power station and a more modern 
gas-fired combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) would increase [12]. They also argue that in the future, a 
greater proportion of allowances can and should be auctioned. Szabó et al. developed a global dynamic 
simulation model of the cement industry, quantifying the benefit achieved from emission trading in 
different markets (EU15, EU27 and Annex B) and assessing the magnitude of the potential carbon 
leakage effect [13]. Chappin and Dijkema present an agent-based model to elucidate the effect of CET 
on the decisions of power companies in an oligopolistic market [14]. They find that that even after the 
introduction of CET, capacity expansion plans indicate a preference for coal. In power generation, the 
economic effect of CET is not sufficient to outweigh the economic incentives in choosing coal. 
Agent-based modeling (ABM) is a typical bottom-up method. Nowadays, agent-based model have 
received increasing attentions from many researchers in the ﬁeld of energy system modeling [15]. 
ABM is thought of as a powerful tool for studying complex adaptive systems. 
The applications of agent-based methods in energy market reform and energy policy simulation 
are mainly focused on the study of electricity market. Bunn and Oliveira used an agent-based 
simulation of England and Wales electricity markets to analyze the market power and the market design 
[16]. Based on Sandia models, Ehlen et al. constructed a multi-agent model to simulate both 
uniform-price and real-time price (RTP) contracts of U.S. electricity wholesalers [17]. They found that 
RTP contracts made power loads move from peak to off-peak hours, increased wholesalers’ profits, but 
also created susceptibilities to short-term market demand and price volatilities. Bunn and Oliveira 
developed a simulation model of technological evolution in electricity markets to analyze how the 
market performance depended upon the different technological types of plant owned by the generators 
 7 
[18]. Hamalainen et al. did a simulation of consumer coalitions in Finnish electricity retail market to 
analyze the response of different types of consumers to Time-Of-Use (TOU) pricing [19]. 
Bernal-agustin et al. presented a realistic simulator of the day-ahead electricity market in mainland 
Spain, which was a good decision-making tool for the electricity market participants [20]. Cong and 
Wei examined whether carbon allowance auction should adopt a uniform-price or discriminatory-price 
format using an agent-based model [21]. They found that a discriminatory-price auction is more 
suitable in terms of maximizing revenue for the government, but an uniform-price auction is better in 
terms of fairness to bidders, especially small bidders. 
The crisis of California electricity market in 2000 reminds us that a new market mechanism, if it 
is not fully tested before practice, can often produce the unexpected impact on the entire economy. 
Because CET is not fully implemented in China up to now [22], in order to analyze its potential impact 
on China power sector under an experiment framework which can be repeated, this paper constructed 
an agent-based model which is named as CETICEM (CET Introduced China Electricity Market) and 
consider electricity price elasticity and carbon market clearing in China, which are very important in 
intra-state CET. We also compare emission-based allocation and output-based allocation, which is of 
particular significance for domestic carbon market mechanism design. 
3. METHODOLOGY: CETICEM 
3.1 Model Settings 
In the model, six types of agents are modeled: a power grid company, power producers, other 
industries, consumers, the government and a carbon market maker. And two markets, the electricity and 
carbon markets are also modeled (as shown in Fig. 1).  
[Insert Fig.1] 
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3.2 The action rules setting 
3.2.1 Power producers 
Power producers aim to maximize their profits. The main actions of the power producers can be 
seen in Fig. 2. At the beginning of each period, power producers obtain carbon quotas and determine 
their electricity supplies. Based on the carbon needed for electricity generation, producers decide to 
buy or sell carbon quotas. At the end of each period, based on the supply and demand of the market and 
of the operations themselves, the producers make decisions to establish or close power plants. 
[Insert Fig.2] 
Which type of plant will be invested in is based on multi-criteria. The size of plant will be decided 
according to the criteria for meeting the electricity demand. The criteria include economic, 
environmental friendliness, nuclear fear, and the constraints of land and water resources.  
The economic criterion indicates the expected profitability of a power plant. The expected 
profitability of producer i’s plant j, ,i jep , can be calculated in equation (1): 
j
i , j i , j j j j j j j j
lt
j j j
ep ( t ) (( cer ( t ) cp( t ) capa p( t ) capa n fp ( t ) capa m cp( t ) oc )
11-( )
1+infl sub inco ) / inco11-
1+infl
= × + × - × × - × × -
× + -
 (1) 
Definitions of the parameters and variables in equation (1) are shown in Table 1 and Table 2. 
Expected profitability is based on the ratio of discounted net cash flows in each period and total 
investment costs. Different from previous studies, we consider the impact of carbon quota 
( , ( ) ( )i jcer t cp t× ) and capital rate ( infl ). In equation (1), carbon quota rights can be seen as revenue 
because it is free allocated by government. 
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[Insert Table 1] 
[Insert Table 2] 
At the same time, producers may prefer environmentally friendly electricity generation 
technology (for which jm  is smaller). The construction of nuclear plants does not only depend on 
producers’ attitudes, but also on national policy. The construction of wind plants and hydropower 
stations depends on available land and water resources, respectively. The plants are graded, the ones 
with higher grade having a greater probability of being invested in. 
We assume that there are three types of producers: profit-hunting producers, environmentally 
friendly producers and neutral producers, with weights of profit-hunting and environmental friendliness 
as follows: (0.7, 0), (0.3, 0.4) and (0.5, 0.2), respectively. For example, the weight on the expected 
profitability for profit-hunting producers is 0.7, while it is 0.3 for environmentally friendly producers. 
The weight on the expected profitability for neutral producers is 0.5, which means their relatively 
neutral attitudes to the economic criterion. In reality, profit-hunting producers may refer to private 
power companies whose objective is only profit maximization. Environmentally friendly producers 
may refer to public power companies. Not only profit maximization but also environmental protection 
is their objectives. Neutral producers fall in between two types of producers above. 
While investing, producers will firstly decide their type of producer according to the probability 
vector { , , }i p e nP p p p= , where , ,p e np p p represent the probabilities of turning to profit-hunting 
producers, environmentally friendly producers and neutral producers. They will then adjust their 
vectors at the end of each period based on the rules described in Table 3. For example, when producer’s 
type is profit-hunting, if it can make profits, the probability of turning to profit-hunting is increased 
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by∆ , the other two probabilities are decreased by
2
∆
. 
[Insert Table 3] 
The rules of probability adjusting are inspired by reinforcement learning theory where agents take 
actions to maximize their long-term utilities. So the action which can get larger utility is more likely 
adopted in the future. Through the reinforcement-learning mechanism mentioned above, we can study 
whether different market design will shift consumers’ preferences. 
3.2.2 Government 
The government’s main aim is to reduce emissions and stabilize the electricity price. Its actions 
include subsidizing environmentally friendly technology, laying the carbon allocation plan, setting the 
national nuclear policy and controlling the electricity price. Carbon allocation in our model focuses on 
two of these actions: 
(Ⅰ) Emission-based allocation: The previous year’s emission proportion is the standard used for 
setting emission quotas in the following year, which is the current quota allocation mechanism in the 
EU ETS. Producer i’s emission quota, ( )icer t , can be calculated in equation (2): 
       i
i
i
i
emi ( t 1)cer ( t ) to _ cap( t )
emi ( t 1)
γ
-
= × ×
-∑
                  (2) 
where ( 1)iemi t -  is producer i’s carbon emissions in period t-1; _ ( )to cap t  is total carbon 
quota in period t; and γ  is the decrease in the rate of the quota.  
, ( )i jcer t in (1) is defined as equation (3): 
             j i , j
i , j
j i , j
i j
m su ( t 1)
cer ( t ) to _ cap( t )
m su ( t 1)
γ
× -
= × ×
× -∑∑
                 (3) 
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where , ( 1)i jsu t - is electricity supply of producer i’s plant j in period t-1. 
(Ⅱ) Output-based allocation: The supply proportion of the previous year’s electricity is the 
standard used for setting emission quotas for the following year, as shown in equation (4): 
i
i
i
i
su ( t 1)cer ( t ) to _ cap( t )
su ( t 1)
γ
-
= × ×
-∑
                    (4) 
su ( 1)i t -  is producer i’s electricity supply in period t-1. In this case, , ( )i jcer t in (1) is defined 
as equation (5): 
i , j
i , j
i , j
i j
su ( t 1)
cer ( t ) to _ cap( t )
su ( t 1)
γ
-
= × ×
-∑∑
                  (5) 
And the relationship between cer_i(t) and cer_i,j(t) is shown in equation (4): 
,( ) ( )i i j
j
cer t cer t=∑  
Although in the first phase of EU ETS, other allocation modes, such as auction, have been in 
practice. But there were only three countries (Ireland, Hungary and Lithuania) choosing auction. And 
the percentages of carbon allowances auctioned are relatively few. Therefore, we choose two free 
grandfathering allocations which drew the most attentions and try to compare them. 
3.2.3 Industry 
The industry’s aim is to sell products to maximize profit. We use an agent to represent industry 
and assume its demand is determined by an exogenous scenario. Because power sector is our focus, 
industry agent’s carbon demand is set exogenously here. We will expand our object of study in the 
future. 
3.2.4 Power grid company 
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The action of the power grid company is setting the transmission and distribution tariff. In 2007, 
the average transmission and distribution tariff was 160.12 Yuan/KKWH, which accounted for 31.49% 
of the electricity price [23]. Therefore, in the model retail electricity price equals to 131.49% of 
average electricity price. 
3.2.5 Consumers 
According to different sale prices, we divide consumers into two categories: small and large 
electricity consumers. Small consumers need to bear the electricity price, and large consumers need to 
cover the electricity price and capacity price. We use two agents to represent consumers. 
China’s electricity demand is mainly driven by GDP . Meanwhile, as a commodity, its demand 
is certainly affected by its price. Therefore, we assume electricity demand is decided by GDP growth 
and its price changes accordingly. The consumers’ decisions are shown in equation (6): 
GDP(t) P(t)D(t)=D(t-1) [1+( -1) α] [1+( -1) ]
GDP(t-1) P(t-1)
β× × × ×            (6) 
where ( )GDP t  refers to GDP in period t; ( )P t  represents retail electricity price in period t; 
α  is the GDP elasticity of electricity demand; and β  is the retail price elasticity of electricity 
demand. 
3.2.6 Carbon market maker 
The primary function of the carbon market maker is to provide market liquidity and balance the 
supply and demand of the carbon market. The cumulative imbalance in period t, ( )pool t , can be 
calculated as in equation (7): 
pool( t ) pool( t 1) car _ d( t ) car _ s( t )= - + -                  (7) 
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where _ ( )car d t  refers to total carbon demand in period t; _ ( )car s t  is total carbon supply 
in period t; and ( ) 0pool t >  represents cumulative CO2 demand is larger than CO2 supply, and vice 
versa. 
3.3 The market rules 
3.3.1 Electricity market 
A two-part electricity price system operates in China, comprising the electricity price and capacity 
price. The capacity price is based on the average investment cost of generating units, which aims to 
compensate for investment cost and finance charges. The electricity price is determined by the market. 
This paper sets the rules as follows: in period t, firstly, each plant decides the electricity supply, 
,_ ( )i jw s t . If the expected return of generation is less than selling the carbon quota, the electricity 
supply is zero; otherwise, the supply equals its capacity. The average market price, _ ( )bid ave t , can 
be calculated in equation (8): 
n m
i , j i , j
i 1 j 1
n m
i , j
i 1 j 1
w _ s ( t ) bid ( t )
bid _ ave( t )
w _ s ( t )
= =
= =
×
=
∑∑
∑∑
                     (8) 
As shown in equation (8), the average market price is weighed to the capacity of the bids. The bid 
price of plant j owned by producer i is composed of cost and profit, shown in equation (9): 
i , j j j j j j
i j
bid ( t ) [ fp ( t ) capa ( t ) oc ( t ) capa ( t ) m cp( t )]
(1 m ar ave _ m ar) / capa ( t )
= × + + × ×
× + ×
       (9) 
where _ave mar denotes the average profit rate of the electricity industry, which is set 
exogenously; and imar  is the ratio of producer i’s profit rate and the electricity industry’s profit rate.  
Based on the argument that the bidding price determines the amount of capacity sold, the actual 
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supply of plant j owned by producer i is shown in equation (10): 
i
i , j i , j n m
i , j
i , j
i 1 j 1
bid _ ave ( t )D( t )s ( t ) w _ s ( t )
bid ( t )w _ s ( t )
= =
= × ×
∑∑
                (10) 
In period t, the average electricity price, _ ( )ave ep t , is shown in equation (11): 
n m
i , j
i 1 j 1
( ( to _ D( t ) w_ s ( t ) ))
ave _ ep( t ) bid _ ave( t ) e
θ
= =
× -∑∑
= ×                (11) 
where θ  is a proportional coefficient, which reflects price fluctuations when there is an 
imbalance between supply and demand.  
As mentioned above, the bids of power plants determine the frequency of their usage. In reality, 
the actual price received for the electricity produced by a specific power plant is related to the height of 
its bid price. The electricity price for each plant is shown in equation (12): 
i , j
i , j
bid ( t )
ep ( t ) ave _ ep( t )
bid _ ave( t )
= ×                    (12) 
Some validations of equations above can be found in Chappin’s research [24]. 
3.3.2 Carbon market 
We assume that the carbon price is affected by carbon supply and demand. The current carbon 
price is affected by the total available quotas and emissions of the last period (current emission is not 
available). In period t, carbon price, ( )cp t , is as shown in equation (13): 
( ( total _ emission( t 1 ) total _ cap( t ) pool( t )))
tcp( t ) cp(0 ) e (1 )
l e× - - += × × + , 2t N(0,0.01 )e        (13) 
where l  is a proportional coefficient. In addition, a random disturbance, te , is also added to the 
model to explain other random factors and cp(0) is the initial value for the carbon price, which is set to 
100 according to the EU ETS and exchange rate. 
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3.4 Model implementation 
The software used here is NetLogo which is a cross-platform multi-agent programmable modeling 
environment. We created 90 agents as electricity power producers, each producer having a number of 
plants. Relevant parameters’ value of power plants are shown in the appendix Table 1. The agents 
evolve over time by action and interaction. The total simulation length is 100 periods. The model 
procedure is repeated until the end of the simulated period is reached.  
4. EXPERIMENT DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 
The main assumptions underlying the model are an electricity market with perfect competition, a 
static number of electricity producers and a limited available power plant types. Main input data are 
listed in appendix Table 2. 
4.1 Impact of carbon emission trading (CET) on electricity price 
First of all, we explore the impact of introducing CET on the electricity price in China. The 
emission-based allocation, which was used in EU ETS, is chose here as the baseline scenario. We 
obtain different electricity prices corresponding to whether CET is introduced or not. With due 
consideration of availability of data, 2007 is chose as the base year. Data from China state electricity 
regulatory commission are used to calibrate the model. In 2007, average on-grid price for wind power 
is 617.58 Yuan/KKWH; for nuclear power is 436.23 Yuan/KKWH; for thermal power is 346.33 
Yuan/KKWH; for hydro power is 244.04 Yuan/KKWH. 
[Insert Fig.3] 
We can see from Fig. 3 that compared to no CET, introducing CET has the following effects: 
increase in the level and fluctuation of the electricity price in most cases; at the end of 100 periods 
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(here one period means one year), the electricity price is 1.23 times higher; and fluctuation of the 
electricity price is 1.04 times higher (see Table 4). Therefore, introducing CET internalizes costs and 
transfers the volatility of the carbon price to the electricity market. 
[Insert Table 4] 
Next, we study the impact of CET on the electricity price under different GDP growth rates. We 
do a simulation of the electricity price at the end of 100 periods corresponding to different GDP growth 
rates. The results are shown in Fig. 4. 
 [Insert Fig.4] 
We can see from Fig. 4 that if no CET is introduced, when the GDP growth rate is low, the 
electricity price growth rate is high; and when the GDP growth rate is high, the electricity price growth 
rate shows a decreasing trend. On the one hand, economic development encourages electricity 
consumption and drives up the electricity price. On the other hand, increase in the electricity price 
suppresses consumption. Therefore, economic development has both positive and negative impact on 
electricity consumption, which in return reflects the trend of decrease in electricity price growth. 
However, electricity price growth shows an increasing trend when CET is introduced. This is because, 
in addition to the above impact, economic development also demands carbon, which pushes up the 
carbon price. The carbon price increase is reflected in the electricity price, pushing up the electricity 
price. Therefore, to address China’s growing economy, the Chinese government should establish 
regulatory measures if CET will be introduced. 
4.2 Impact of CET on power source structure 
Next, we consider the impact of CET on China’s power source structure. The emission-based 
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allocation is also chose here. 
[Insert Fig. 5] 
[Insert Fig. 6] 
We can see from Figs. 5 and 6 that introducing CET brings forward large-scale natural gas power 
generation. At the same time, we can see from the final power source structure (Table 5) that there is an 
increase in the proportion of environmentally friendly power generation technology (nuclear power, 
solar power and gas-fired power). Among them, solar power, which provides environmental protection 
but is expensive, develops a lot after introducing CET. Due to land and water constraints, the 
proportions of wind power and hydropower, respectively, do not increase after CET is introduced, 
although, the absolute amount of wind power increases slightly. 
[Insert Table 5] 
4.3 Comparison of emission-based allocation and output-based allocation 
[Insert Fig. 7] 
As can be seen from Fig. 7, the evolution of the electricity price and carbon price of the two 
allocation mechanisms is similar. However, the electricity price of output-based allocation is lower 
because of the lower carbon price. We would like to know what the micro mechanism for this macro 
phenomenon is and the difference of producers under both market mechanisms. 
We analyze the final producers’ proportions according to the type of allocation, i.e., 
emission-based and output-based allocations (initial proportions: economic producers, 0.3; 
environmentally friendly producers, 0.3; neutral producers, 0.4). The results are as follows: 
[Insert Table 6] 
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[Insert Table 7] 
As can be seen from Table 6, when emission-based allocation is introduced, the proportion of 
economic producers (0.394) is larger than the proportion when output-based allocation is introduced 
(0.328). As seen from Table 7, the probability of F is 0.544 for projected proportion of profit-hunting 
producers, which is insignificant at the 5% level. Thus, we believe that equal variances assumed under 
two allocations are not rejected. Next, let us look at the results corresponding to assumptions of equal 
variances. The value of t is 8.845, with probability is 0.000. The result rejects the null hypothesis and 
shows that there is a significant difference between the proportions of economic producers under the 
two allocation mechanisms. 
We do a similar analysis on neutral and environmentally friendly producers (intermediate results 
are shown in Table 8 and 9). The robust test is also done for different initial proportion settings. The 
final results are shown in Fig. 8. 
[Insert Table 8] 
[Insert Table 9] 
[Insert Fig. 8] 
As seen in Fig. 8, when emission-based allocation is introduced, the proportion of economic 
producers (0.394) is higher compared to output-based allocation (0.328). In other words, 
emission-based allocation causes producers to turn to less environmentally friendly technologies. In 
essence, emission-based allocation allocates more carbon quotas to producers who emit more. This is 
an incentive for emissions. From a broader sense, emission-based allocation is designed for 
compensating bodies which are affected by emission control [25-27].  
Output-based allocation encourages producers to be environment-friendly. Therefore, total 
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emissions are lower, resulting in a lower carbon price. In this perspective, in the Chinese domestic 
carbon market, for the same sector, output-based allocation is more efficient for reducing emissions. 
The results here may be different from the general opinion which was established in standard 
market theory that the method of allocation of a given number of emission certificates should not affect 
the equilibrium price. Because the producers in our model can shift their investment preferences in the 
two allowance allocations, output-based allocation makes producers tend to be environment-friendly, 
which will decrease total carbon demand and carbon price. 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we studied the impact of introduction of CET on China’s power sector using an 
agent-based model. The main findings are as follows: 
(1) CET internalizes the external environmental cost, which increases the average electricity price 
(12%). At the same time, the volatility of the carbon market is also transferred to the electricity market 
(fluctuations excluding the impact of mean increases of 4%). When there is no introduction of CET, the 
electricity price shows a declining trend as the economy develops. However, introduction of CET 
significantly increases the electricity price. Therefore, to address China’s high-speed development, the 
Chinese government should establish specific regulatory measures after introducing CET. 
(2) CET influences the relative costs of different power generation technologies through the 
carbon price, which would have a significant impact on the power source structure. Introduction of 
CET would cause large-scale natural gas generation. The final proportion of environmentally friendly 
power generation technologies such as nuclear power and natural gas power would increase. 
Environmentally friendly solar power would develop significantly after CET is introduced (final 
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proportion, 14% increase). In contrast, the final proportion of coal-fired power, whose emissions are 
high, would decrease significantly by 18%. 
(3) Emission-based allocation produces both a higher electricity price and higher carbon price, 
compared to output-based allocation. This is because under the latter allocation, producers would tend 
to be more environmentally friendly. Compared to emission-based allocation, output-based allocation 
would be more conducive to environmental protection. Therefore, output-based allocation should be 
considered in the design of the Chinese domestic CET market. 
As we know, this paper is the first one which studied the potential impact of CET on China power 
sector in a computable framework. It will provide China government and related decision-makers a 
quantity tool for designing carbon market. This paper also firstly explains which free allocation is 
better and the micro mechanism behind it, which is a necessary supplement to existing literatures. 
This paper does not endogenously model the Chinese fuel market. We also do not consider entry 
and quit mechanisms for producers. Demand elasticity of electricity is constant. These are left to 
address in future research. 
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Table 1. Description of parameters 
Parameter Description Parameter Description 
α  GDP elasticity of electricity 
demand 
β  price elasticity of electricity demand 
γ  the decrease in the rate of the quota l  proportional coefficient 
θ  proportional coefficient _ave mar  
the average profit rate of the electricity 
industry 
jcapa  Capacity of electricity plant j jinco  Investment cost for plant j 
Infl  Capital interest rate jlt  Plant j’s life 
jm  
Carbon needed for plant j’s unit of 
electricity i
mar  the ratio of producer i’s profit rate and the 
electricity industry’s profit rate 
jn  
Fuel needed for plant j’s unit of 
electricity j
oc  Operation cost for plant j in one period 
jsub  
Subsidy for plant j, which is 
environmentally friendly 
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Table 2. Description of variables 
Variables Description Variables Description 
_ ( )ave ep t  The average electricity price i , jbid ( t )  
The bid price of plant j owned by 
producer i in period t 
_ ( )bid ave t  The average market price _ ( )car d t  total carbon demand in period t 
_ ( )car s t  total carbon supply in period 
t 
( )icer t  Producer i’s emission quota 
, ( )i jcer t  
Carbon quota of producer i’s 
plant j  
( )cp t  carbon price in period t 
D(t)  electricity demand in period t ( )iemi t  
producer i’s carbon emissions in 
period t 
i , jep ( t )  
The electricity price for 
producer i’s plant j 
( )jfp t  Fuel price for plant j 
( )GDP t  GDP in period t ( )P t  Retail electricity price in period t 
( )pool t  The cumulative imbalance in 
period t i , j
s ( t )  the actual supply of plant j 
owned by producer i in period t 
, ( )i jsu t  
electricity supply of producer 
i’s plant j in period t 
su ( )i t  
producer i’s electricity supply in 
period t 
total _ cap( t )  total available quotas in 
period t 
total _ emission( t )  emissions in period t 
_ ( )to cap t  total carbon quota _ ( )ijw s t  
the electricity supply of producer 
i’s plant j in period t 
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Table 3. The rules of probability adjusting 
Producer’s type when investing Whether the plant can make 
profits? 
Probability adjusting 
Profit-hunting producers 
Yes { , , }
2 2p e n
P p p p∆ ∆← +∆ - -  
No { , , }
2 2p e n
P p p p∆ ∆← -∆ + +  
Environmentally friendly 
producers 
Yes { , , }
2 2p e n
P p p p∆ ∆← - + ∆ -  
No { , , }
2 2p e n
P p p p∆ ∆← + -∆ +  
Neutral producers 
Yes { , , }
2 2p e n
P p p p∆ ∆← - - + ∆  
No { , , }
2 2r e n
P p p p∆ ∆← + + -∆  
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Table 4. Comparison of electricity prices under different mechanisms 
Electricity price CET introduced No CET introduced Ratio 
Electricity price at the end of 100 periods
（yuan/KKWH） 
1162.6 947.26 1.23 
Maximum electricity price （yuan/KKWH） 1170.38 965.61  
Minimum electricity price （yuan/KKWH） 486 486  
Average electricity price （yuan/KKWH） 876.44 780.72 1.12 
Standard deviation （yuan/KKWH） 176.10 150.13 1.3 
Standard deviation coefficient 0.20 0.19 1.04 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 27 
Table 5. Comparison of power source structures under different schemes 
 CET introduced No CET introduced 
The beginning period of large-scale gas power 
generation（Proportion > 8%） 
2 34 
Final portfolio 
(%) 
Hydropower 6.83 11.13 
Solar power 24.27 16.51 
Wind power 0.31 0.50 
Solar power 25.25 11.10 
Coal-fired power 17.79 36.13 
Gas-fired power 25.53 24.64 
The absolute 
amount (MW) 
Hydropower 441477.8 453848.2 
Wind power 20225 20205.9 
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Table 6. Group statistics of economic producers 
Type of producer Mean Std. deviation Minimum Maximum 
Emission-based 0.394 0.053 0.3 0.6 
Output-based 0.328 0.0534 0.2 0.5 
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Table 7. Independent sample t test for proportion of economic producers 
 Levene’s test for 
equality of variances 
t-test for equality of means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Projected proporation 
of profit-hunting 
Producers 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
0.369 0.544 8.845 198 0.000 0.0666 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  8.845 197.989 0.000 0.0666 
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Table 8. Group statistics of environmentally friendly producers 
Type of producer Mean Std. deviation Minimum Maximum 
Emission-based 0.266 0.048 0.14 0.44 
Output-based 0.327 0.051 0.21 0.48 
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Table 9. Group statistics of neutral producers 
Type of producer Mean Std. deviation Minimum Maximum 
Emission-based 0.339 0.051 0.19 0.456 
Output-based 0.345 0.0538 0.22 0.49 
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Fig. 1 System structure 
Fig. 2 Flow chart of power producers’ actions 
Fig. 3 Electricity prices corresponding to different mechanisms (GDP growth, 3%; interest rate, 
3%; reduction of quota, 2%) 
Fig. 4 Electricity price at the end of 100 periods corresponding to different GDP growth rates 
Fig. 5 Power source structure when CET is introduced 
Fig. 6 Power source structure when CET is not introduced 
Fig. 7 Electricity price and carbon price of two carbon quota allocations 
Fig. 8 Impact of introducing CET on final producers’ proportions 
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Fig. 1 System structure 
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Fig. 2 Flow chart of power producers’ actions 
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Fig. 3 Electricity prices corresponding to different mechanisms (GDP growth, 3%; interest rate, 
3%; reduction of quota, 2%) 
Note: we define GDP growth is 3%, because it will show the convergence trend in the long term. We 
also do the sensitivity analysis for different GDP and get the similar results. 
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Fig. 4 Electricity price at the end of 100 periods corresponding to different GDP growth rates 
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Fig. 5 Power source structure when CET is introduced 
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Fig. 6 Power source structure when CET is not introduced 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 39 
400
800
1200
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84 88 92 96 10
0
Year
E
l
e
c
t
r
i
c
i
t
y
 
p
r
i
c
e
(
y
u
a
n
 
p
e
r
 
K
K
W
H
)
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
C
a
r
b
o
n
 
p
r
i
c
e
(
y
u
a
n
 
p
e
r
 
t
o
n
)
Electricity price emission-based (left axis) Electricity price output-based (left axis)
Carbon price emission-based (right axis） Carbon price output-based (right axis)
 
 
Fig. 7 Electricity price and carbon price of two carbon quota allocations 
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Fig. 8 Impact of introducing CET on final producers’ proportions 
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Appendix Table 1. Parameters’ values of power plants 
Type Life 
( jlt ) 
Installed 
capacity 
( jcapa ) 
（MW） 
Unit cost of power 
generation 
( ( )j jfp t n× ) 
(yuan/KKWH) 
Construction 
cost ( jinco ) 
(yuan/KKWH) 
Carbon emission 
( jm ) (ton 
CO2/KKWH) 
Hydrostation 30 600 240 6000 0 
Nuclear plant 40 300 440 12000 0 
Wind plant 20 10 620 8000 0 
Solar plant 20 20 1900 10000 0 
Coal-fired 
plant 
20 300 350 4000 1.3 
Gas-fired 
plant 
20 120 800 4000 0.7 
Source: [28, 29]. Some data are from the historical data of plants that have been established. 
Others are authors’ calculations according to actual survey data from Chinese power plants. 
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Appendix Table 2. Main input data 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
α  0.8 β  -0.1 
l  0.005 γ  0.95 
θ  0.001 _ave mar  0.1 
Infl  0.03 imar  1 
joc  0 jsub  0 
(0)cp  100   
 
 
 
